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Abstract
This paper explores the progress of financial integration in 
Asia   by   comparison   with   the   EU.   In   the   process   of 
development the Asian countries have focused more on access 
to the main markets of the world than to each other. Only 
more recently after the experience of unwelcome contagion in 
the crises of 1997-8 has there been a concerted effort to 
develop instruments to promote greater financial stability in 
the face of external shocks. Many initiatives are currently 
underway to improve regional financial integration and there 
is a movement to achieve monetary integration. However, the 
region is very heterogenous and inequalities  in size and 
development will make full integration difficult. The process 
is thus likely to be drawn out but there is a clear direction.
The Asian countries discovered they how heavily they were financially integrated in 
the crises of 1997.
1 The countries in the region have in general been very open to 
capital flows but had not spent a great deal of effort on regional integration. The 
regional initiatives had been dominated by trade and cooperation, and, in general, 
financial integration had occurred through the market rather than through determined 
political action. If anything the 1997 experience caused the countries to step back 
from increasing financial openness, both in imposing more extensive capital controls 
as in the case of Malaysia and in trying to set up regional cooperation among the 
1 For the purposes of this discussion, south Asia in the form of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka is omitted, as these countries are not included in many of the regional initiatives. In the same 
way the wider definition of Asia-Pacific is not included even though that group does have some 
common initiatives particularly for example through EMEAP (the Executives Meeting of East Asia and 
Pacific central banks). (See Box 1 on groupings of countries in the region.) Thus the analysis includes 
the 10 East Asian Nations: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, with some limited discussion of the rest of ASEAN; Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. This total grouping is normally referred to as ASEAN + 3 
and the grouping of ASEAN countries within our list of 10: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, the ASEAN-5.
1central banks in a form that would enable them to isolate their economies better from 
financial shocks to one or other of their members.
2
Regional integration has not been driven by the strong sense of political and 
non-economic purpose that has characterised its European counterpart but the Asian 
countries have observed that European integration has been a source of regional 
strength and stability and looked to see what might be developed for their own 
benefit. Most of the interest in the financial field has focused on monetary integration, 
not   simply   because   that   is   technically   much   easier   to   achieve   than   financial 
integration but because the Asian crises were primarily foreign exchange crises, 
although these spilled over into banking crises, particularly in Indonesia. The focus of 
action has been on trying to develop bond markets, particularly through what is 
labelled the Chiang Mai initiative in 2000, which enables a network of currency 
swaps to be activated among the member countries. The concern (Sa and Guérin, 
2006) is that much of the problem in the Asian crisis occurred because countries had 
difficulties matching both currencies and maturities in the period of turbulence. If 
bond markets had been deeper then they might have been able to recover much more 
rapidly.
A second concern, identified very clearly in Gernberg et al. (2005), is that the 
lack of development of financial markets in the Asian region is contributing to global 
imbalances and is inhibiting both future growth and stability. The high savings rates 
in the region are not entirely soaked up domestically and it is argued that some of the 
build up of foreign assets is not simply because of the imbalance in trade and 
artificially low exchange rates but because there is a lack of domestic instruments of a 
quality approaching those in the US, Europe and elsewhere among the advanced 
countries.
The growth strategy of the Asian countries has meant that their first objective 
has been access to the major markets round the world and they have therefore acted 
internationally rather than regionally. Hence measures of openness can be misleading 
as they reflect this internationalisation. Having developed substantially but separately 
they have been turning increasing attention to their own region as it has become an 
important market in its own right.
2 Chinn and Ito (2007) compute an index which shows how much the rate of increase of financial 
openness among the Asian countries has slowed since the crises.
2A preliminary
Asia is a heterogenous region (see Table 1), not simply in terms of size, with China 
larger than all the other countries added together in terms of population and larger in 
terms of GDP than all the rest together except Japan but also in terms of level of 
development. Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are all 
comparable with the rest of the developed world in terms of GDP per head in 
purchasing power parity terms.
3 South Korea, the lowest ranked of these five at 28
th in 
the world tabulation, is only five places below New Zealand and is above Portugal, 
while Japan is higher than Germany. Brunei is in the same league in financial terms 
but this derives from oil wealth and does not reflect a similar level of development 
across much of the country. These countries have a similar range of GDP per capita to 
the current euro area. There is then a wide gap in levels, with Malaysia next in line 
having half the GDP per head of South Korea. There is then another gap to the 
Philippines, with the rest of the countries going right on down to Laos and Myanmar, 
which are only a tenth of the South Korean level, itself 30% lower than Singapore.
This is a major diversity and clearly the process of integration in such a region 
will itself be a much more diverse process, with barriers that bear little relation to 
economic development coming down first. However, generalised integration, even in 
financial markets, is unlikely to be rapid even though the countries may be converging 
– very rapidly in some cases. Deeper integration is thus more likely among subgroups, 
as is reflected in the various groupings that have been formed (Box 1 for example).
Institutional linkages
Up until the crisis there were two main institutional routes to the expansion of 
regional integration, other than the normal bilateral contacts: the central banks and 
governmental (see Box 1). The central banking organisations are the older. SEANZA 
was formed in 1956, primarily as a means of providing training throughout the region 
– very widely defined.
4 This was developed into a much more substantial training and 
research institution SEACEN, beginning in 1972. It has developed a centre in Kuala 
Lumpur (separate from the Bank Negara) but courses are put on in various of the 
3 These figures all come from the IMF but differences in calculation depending upon the PPPs used can 
change both the absolute levels and the rankings quite considerably but the general pattern remains for 
these countries whichever of the well-known sources are used.
4 Every other year the members take it in turns to put on a focused training course for promising 
younger staff. However, the organisation of this provides an opportunity for meetings and exchange of 
views at a more senior level.
3member countries each year. However, most relevant to the development of financial 
integration has been EMEAP, the somewhat curiously named Executives Meeting of 
East Asia and Pacific Central Banks, set up in 1991 and supported by the Bank of 
Japan. This has enabled practical working level cooperation. A number of working 
groups have been set up on specific issues over time, including recently: banking 
supervision, financial markets, and payment and settlement systems.
The oldest intergovernmental institution is ASEAN, set up in 1967 by 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and since expanded to 
cover all 10 of the South East Asian countries and in 1999 to include China, Japan 
and South Korea in the annual financial discussions (ASEAN+3). The original 
grouping of 5 is usually now labelled ASEAN-5. Financial matters form only a small 
part   of   the  organisation’s   activities,   which   include   most   aspects   of   economic 
cooperation. The secretariat is in Jakarta. Since the effective economic region was 
rather wider and the main countries excluded a much wider Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) was set up in 1989 and expanded to include monetary and 
financial issues in 1994. Most of the main countries with a claim to have a Pacific 
coastline are members, with a secretariat in Singapore.
Since the crises most of the main international organisations have sought to 
encourage   regional   financial   and   monetary   integration,   particularly   the   Asian 
Development Bank
5  and the IMF, but also the BIS and the World Bank.
6  The 
relationship with the EU through ASEM (the Asia Europe Meeting) was formalised 
just beforehand in 1996 and provides a direct opportunity to discuss aspects of the 
European experience relevant for steps towards regional integration in Asia. At the 
developmental stage it is probably an advantage to have such a range of competing 
organisations trying to move the countries of Asia closer, generally as well as 
financially. More political commitment is needed before a dedicated organisation like 
the European Commission becomes appropriate. 
Progress in integration
5 See ADB (2004) for example.
6 Of course regional integration is only a part of the agenda and the IMF/World Bank has sought to 
improve financial development and stability in all of the Asian countries by a variety of means 
including FSAPs (financial sector assessment programs).
4Inter-regional trade in Asia is smaller than in the EU. In ASEAN inter-regional trade 
comprises a little less than a quarter of the total but once China, Japan and South 
Korea are added (ASEAN+3) the share is close to 40% (2004 figures) compared to 
nearer 60% in the euro area. However, while euro area shares are falling inter-
regional trade in Asia is rising. Intra-regional trade growth is primarily intra-industry, 
largely occurring because of vertical specialisation and output relocation within the 
region. Much of the growth has occurred in exports of intermediate goods (Cowen et 
al, 2006). However, aggregate numbers are dominated by China (Zhang et al., 2005). 
Intra-area exports in the ASEAN-5 fell between 1992-8 and 1999-2005 in all 
countries except Indonesia.
Discussions of Asian integration in the 1980s were affected by worries of 
Japanese dominance. However these fears have been replaced by concerns over 
Chinese dominance. Because of the disparity in size of the economies, continuing 
growth in China at anything like recent rates will lead to considerable convergence in 
the economies to the Chinese economic cycle.
Financial integration does not match the degree of integration through trade. 
Although nearly half of outward FDI from ASEAN+3 goes elsewhere in the region it 
only forms 20% of inward FDI. The distinction is to quite some extent between 
ASEAN and the ‘+3’. Nearly three quarters of ASEAN FDI goes to the ASEAN+3, 
while 60% of FDI into ASEAN comes from ASEAN+3. The discrepancy in economic 
size matters. China is acting as an increasing focus for investment both from outside 
and within the region. China is no longer simply a production base but an important 
market in its own right. By comparison the shares of the EU in its own inward and 
outward FDI are fairly similar, forming 60%-70% of total FDI in each direction.
Against this background, the region received roughly half the global supply of 
net private capital flows during 2003-4, with their outstanding portfolio of US$ 1.9 
trillion forming some 8% of the world total and 19% of these countries’ GDP. 
However, by contrast, the Asian countries foreign assets had reached US$2.8 trillion 
by the end of 2004 – 29% of GDP. The shares in both the assets and liabilities are 
equally divided between North America and the EU(15), with the intra-Asian region 
assets and liabilities forming only around 10% of the total.
Banking activity is even less regional. The main foreign players are European 
(particularly the UK) and from the US with Japanese banks only following in third 
place (South Korea excepted, where they have an important share). Financial activity 
5is increasing rapidly, with claims doubling between 1999 and 2005. But of these 
claims only 10% are on intra-regional banks and this share is falling not rising. 
However, it is important not to overlook the importance of transactions by Asian 
investors in overseas markets (IMF, 2005; BIS, 2002). Moreover cross-border 
acquisitions are taking place, particularly from Singapore.
There is some debate over whether it is the lack of financial integration that is 
contributing to the lack of intra-regional trade or whether the causation is the other 
way round. Eichengreen and Park (2004) subscribe to the former view and Fukao et 
al. (2003) and Ronci (2004) to the latter. However, these authors use different data, 
with Eichengreen and Park focusing on banks, Fukao et al. on FDI and Ronci on 
short-term credits. Simple correlations of trade and financial flows among the East 
Asia countries (China and Taiwan excluded through lack of data) undertaken by 
Cowen et al. (2006) for the period 2001-2004 suggest that correlations are positive but 
relatively small (compared to OECD countries). One year lags or leads have little 
effect so it is not possible to judge any causal impact.
All this suggests that East Asian financial and economic integration is likely to 
increase over the future, as it is lower than in regions where the barriers are lower, and 
the general trend is towards a reduction in barriers. Furthermore, as Asia becomes 
more of a market in itself, rather than a production location for addressing other 
markets, the existing pattern that has been rather distorted by the direction of the 
process of growth will tend to move towards that more common elsewhere. To quite 
some extent the speed will depend on the rate of removal of barriers and the degree of 
political encouragement.
Steps to integrate financial markets
Since the Asian crises there have been several concrete intergovernmental 
actions to achieve greater financial integration that will be a help to the financial 
stability of the countries in the region. The best known, the Chiang Mai initiative in 
2000, among the ASEAN+3, is an attempt to create a range of swap arrangements that 
would be sufficient for a member country to protect itself against speculative attacks 
when its fundamental position is sustainable. Most of the swap arrangements enable a 
country under attack to obtain US dollars from the other countries provided that it is 
taking adequate counter measures, such as an IMF endorsed programme.
7 It is thus 
7 The arrangements with China and Japan allow the swap to be in those countries’ currencies
6couched in terms that should reduce any credit risk to a minimum. Furthermore it is 
likely to form part of the recovery package rather than provide immediate help except 
as an assurance to foreign investors for countries that are basically sound but have 
liquidity problems in the event of a sudden loss of confidence. 
It is thus not immediately apparent that this addresses the problem of the 
slowness of the IMF response to the 1997/8 crises (ADB, 2004). However, the scale is 
substantial. By early 2006 some 74bn US$ of swap arrangements were in place and 
Sa and Guérin (2006) suggest that the 6bn US$ swap arranged between Indonesia and 
Japan in August 2005 did help stabilise the Indonesia rupiah market. Nevertheless the 
funds available shown in Box 2 represent only 18%, 36% and 38% of the funds 
arranged for the crisis in 1998 by Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, respectively.
There is thus pressure to expand the pool of resources available and to ensure 
that funds can be accessed rapidly to head off an attack. For both parties to the swap 
to be agreeable to activate the arrangement rapidly some form of surveillance has to 
be in place such that the country under threat can be deemed creditworthy. ADB 
(2004) contains a plan for implementing such an adequate pool over a period of 15 
years. Under the Asian Bond Market Initiative launched by the ADB, bonds have 
been issued by the international organisations (IFC, World Bank and ADB) in some 
of the local currencies, while under the Asian Bond Fund Initiatives lunched by 
EMEAP, the countries have pooled reserves and launched two funds (a Pan-Asian 
bond index fund, PAIF, and a Fund of Bond Funds, FoFB) investing in the sovereign 
and quasi-sovereign bonds in the region.
8 At 3bn US$ these funds are small compared 
with the 1.5trillion US$ bonds outstanding in the region.
The extent of current financial integration
East Asia is noticeably less financially integrated than Europe. Furthermore, as long 
as the crisis period is omitted, stock market movements in the East Asian countries 
are more correlated with movements in the US stock market than they are with the 
region as a whole (Chai and Rhee, 2005). Moreover, both correlations have increased 
since the crisis (1999-2003 compared with 1991-1997) but the gap between them has 
widened, particularly if China is excluded. Thus the relative importance of the US has 
8 Only China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand 
are involved.
7increased.
9 However, exactly the same pattern is observable for the euro area. Stock 
market movements of the EU
10 countries are more closely connected with the US in 
the period since 1999 than they are with each other. Furthermore, their correlation 
with each other, 0.7, is clearly higher than in East Asia at 0.5. Nevertheless, Europe is 
not necessarily a yardstick for what could be achieved in East Asia if financial 
markets were to be equally open, just in the same way that the degree of integration in 
the US is only an indication of what might be the case in the EU when the single 
market becomes the reality that was planned. It is the differences in underlying 
behaviour and structure in the constituent countries and in the shocks that affect them 
that determines the degree of financial integration in an open market.
The period to period raw correlations among stock markets will be affected by 
the source of shocks affecting them. The East Asian countries’ stock markets were 
much more correlated in the crisis than they were with the US and the EU countries 
were much less correlated during their own crisis in 1992/3, when many countries 
were forced to devalue with respect to Germany. In an analysis of market returns, 
Chai and Rhee (2005) show that since the crisis all of the East Asian countries have 
been more affected by regional shocks than they have been by US shocks. Exactly the 
reverse was true in the pre-crisis period (from 1991 on). However, Moon (2001) finds 
that the influence of movements in the US index on the Asian countries increased 
both during and after the crises.
In Europe the break comes earlier. As soon as the aftermath of the 1992/3 
currency crises is past, the EU countries are much more affected by European shocks 
than by US shocks (with the exception of Austria).
11 Perhaps more important for the 
possible future progress of integration is the further finding that pricing is far less 
efficient in East Asian stock markets than in the EU. In the EU it is the unexpected 
that shifts markets compared to one another, whereas in East Asia, information from 
the past in the same market still has an important impact on current prices.
There is also some evidence from the covariance of excess returns in Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand over the period 1980-98 (Phylaktis and Ravazzolo, 2002). The Korean, 
9  Hashmi and Liu (2001), in their study of correlations among the stock markets in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand over the period 1994-2000, have similar findings. 
Correlations have increased since the crisis but the stock markets are much more closely related to 
movements in the US than they are to those in Japan.
10 EU15 excluding Luxembourg.
11 The Austrian case is sufficiently different that there must be some explicit cause in the data.
8Taiwanese and Japanese stock markets are clearly related on this measure as is 
Thailand with the US. Perhaps more interesting is the strong co-movement in stock 
market prices and output growth. This would imply that increasing real convergence 
would lead to greater financial integration in this respect. Of course consumption 
smoothing through international capital flows would imply that a lack of convergence 
would also encourage financial integration (de Brouwer, 1999).
The future path
East Asia has a long way to go in achieving financial integration and there is no 
shortage of advice to the East Asia countries about how they should develop and 
integrate   their   financial   markets;   see   Cowen   et   al.   (2006)   for   example.   The 
international organisations have been encouraging this as a means of increasing the 
financial stability of the region.
12  The actions recommended can be placed in 7 
categories
(1) Removal of capital controls
(2) Removal of internal controls such as the direction of lending for all 
purposes other than prudential regulation, anti-competitive practices 
and consumer protection
(3) Adoption of harmonised non-discriminatory international standards
(4) Creation of a cross-border infrastructure enabling the easy flow of 
payments, settlement and securities transactions
(5) Mutual   recognition   to   allow   cross-border   operation   of   financial 
institutions, local establishment and the interchange of skilled staff.
(6) Harmonisation of detailed requirements
(7) Development of financial institutions
However, there is also a set of general preconditions for successful financial 
integration. Not only must there be a clear legal framework concerning property rights 
and contracts but the rule of law must apply – such contracts must be demonstrably 
enforceable through the courts. The system needs to be transparent, with clear legal 
codes of conduct, restrictions on anticompetitive behaviour, without bribery and 
corruption, good corporate governance practices, a clear internationally recognised set 
of accounting standards and so on. The FSAPs and other international assessments are 
helping in this regard. Again this is an area where the EU experience is helpful in the 
pre-accession programmes for the new member states – not that they were perfect but 
12  The Cowen et al. (2006) paper was written for a Monetary Authority of Singapore and IMF 
conference on Asian Integration. The Asian Development Bank has been particularly active (ADB, 
2004).
9they do give good pointers to what can be achieved and the areas where compliance 
may be difficult to assess.
The first two sets of the recommended actions above are essentially negative 
integration in the sense of removing deliberate barriers. The other five all require 
positive measures and hence the changing of established domestic procedures. These 
are much harder to achieve. Steps 5 and 6 are perhaps the most difficult, as mutual 
recognition entails accepting that other countries are enforcing equivalent standards to 
those being enforced domestically – at a level the group determines satisfactory. In a 
unitary state there is a single set of regulations. In federal states some variation may 
be permitted but in practice, if there are not to be considerable extra costs, the degree 
of harmonisation across countries needs to be considerable – a task the EU is finding 
very time-consuming and slow to achieve despite fast-track authority under the 
Lamfalussy process. It is already more than 20 years since creating the single market 
for financial services in the EU began in earnest and much remains to be achieved. 
East Asia has not yet reached even that starting point and is probably in a similar 
position to the EU in the early 1970s before the ideas of monetary union were 
extensively developed.
The lack of financial integration can be measured in three different ways. One 
is to list the differences in regulations and the outright barriers that exist. However, 
such simple listing does not give a good indication of impact, although an assessment 
can be made. A second is to ask practitioners which barriers are important to them in 
impeding market entry – this proved very effective in the run up to the single 
European market (Cecchini, 1986). The last is to look at the structure of prices and 
quantities and judge how far away these are from what would prevail in an integrated 
market.
Cowen et al. (2006, Appendix II.2) provides a helpful summary of the current 
extent of restrictions on cross-border investment, distinguishing between the money, 
bond and equity markets. This therefore gives a good starting point for a simple 
listing approach to setting out the barriers that need to be removed.
There is very little recent quantitative work to draw on despite a careful survey 
by Cavoli et al. (2004) and some of results are perverse. As a result they develop 
some measures of their own for our basic group of 10 countries (listed in fn 1) for the 
period 1995 to 2002. This gives an opportunity to see the periods before and after the 
crises (and of course during although this is rather short. 
10Taking the price approach first, in all periods, uncovered interest differentials 
indicate the existence of unexploited opportunities for arbitrage profits, which gives 
the implication that effective restraints were in place. During the crises differentials 
were generally positive with respect to the more stable economies of China, Hong 
Kong and Singapore. Since then differentials have narrowed and were negative for 
Thailand, mainly negative for the Philippines and South Korea. Once the interest 
differences are expressed in real terms – i.e. after eliminating relative price inflation – 
Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan show little differential with the US. 
However, the existence of differentials is not itself explanation. It may be 
imperfect capital mobility, imperfect asset substitution, monetary policy or actions by 
the banks – Bird and Rajan (2001) and Rajan et al. (2002) subscribe to this last view. 
It is in any case probably more productive to look at differentials in individual sectors 
rather than at aggregates.
Assessments based on quantitative measures do not fare any better and none of 
the studies relate to the last decade since the crises.
13 However, such univariate studies 
do not really reflect the full extent of financial integration – exchange rate fluctuations 
and uncovered interest deviations both matter, after allowing for differences in 
consumption cycles, trade and inflation (Takagi and Hiroshi, 2002).
Cowen et al. (2006) place a lot of importance on the lack of vehicles for 
mobilising savings within the Asian region. Their principal argument is in favour of 
pension funds and indeed of pension reform that makes people more concerned to 
establish pensions. However, it is not clear that this addresses the principal problem. 
In the main there is no problem in persuading people in East Asia to save in order to 
provide adequate resources for their own old age and for family capital to transfer to 
future generations. The problem is suitable regional vehicles in which to hold these 
savings and instruments in which they can invest.
Completing the picture: monetary integration
Before the Asian crises, most of the countries had pegged their currencies to the US 
dollar, so adoption of monetary union might have appeared relatively more feasible. 
13 Work by Le (2000) covering 1976-96 shows that savings and investment are highly correlated in 
China and Indonesia implying lack of capital mobility but the next greatest correlations are for Hong 
Kong and Singapore, which are clearly towards the open end of the spectrum. Thus the results lack 
credibility (Cavoli et al., 2004). Work by de Brouwer (1999) suggests that there was some consumption 
smoothing in Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore in the decade up to 1992.
11Since then many of the exchange rate regimes have become more flexible as the 
rigidity proved itself a serious problem. Thailand and South Korea are inflation 
targeting and the Japanese and Philippine regimes can be interpreted in a similar light. 
Indonesia has been trying to move to the same regime but in practice like most of the 
region it is running a managed float. Only Brunei has an outright currency board but 
Hong Kong has a fixed peg with the US dollar and the Chinese regime has a very 
tight peg. Nevertheless, the fluctuations, particularly in real rates, are sufficiently 
small that a joint regime might not represent a major change in practice. Instituting it 
however is a different matter altogether.
Monetary union has been actively promoted by a number of groups, most 
notably the Asian Development Bank, who sees it coming in five stages (ADB, 2004), 
the first involving ‘surveillance’ as the countries see how well they perform under the 
current regimes and develop cooperation.
14 The second step would be similar to the 
European EMS and would involve pegging to a common currency basket, perhaps 
labelling this aggregate the ACU to match the ECU. In the second phase this would be 
a loose peg before moving to a tighter peg in stage 3, with a prescribed band for 
permissible   fluctuations.   Stage   4   would   an   Asian   Monetary   System,   with   a 
stabilisation fund and the ACU becoming a monetary unit in its own right. Stage 5 
would be the full monetary union with a common currency.
15
There is no timetable and the report ends with describing this as a ‘long 
process’. The various contributors to ADB (2004) raise a range of difficulties. These 
relate both to the preferable ordering of the process of convergence and to the degree 
to which the countries match the accepted criteria for an optimal currency area either 
now or in the future. However, they all skirt over the crucial governance issues for 
such an area. When one country is larger than the others put together, how is it 
possible to have a union where hegemony is not exerted? (Korhonen and Mayes, 
2007). China is set to become the largest economic entity in the world and can already 
determine its own monetary policy. It will be a difficult task for the rest of the region 
14 A number of surveillance processes are already in place: the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) set 
up in 1998 and then extended to the ASEAN+3 with the Economic review and Policy Dialogue Process 
in 1999; and the less formal Manila Framework Group, set up in 1997 under APEC. ADB also has a 
Regional Economic Monitoring Unit itself.
15 Running through the various proposals that have been made: for an expanded EMEAP (Rajan, 1999), 
for an Asian BIS (RBA, 1999), an Asian Monetary Fund (ADBI, 2000), and Asian Financial Institute 
(Eichengreen, 2001), would require an article of its own but there is clearly no accepted plan for what 
the institutional framework should be. Institutions normally lie at the heart of the process and its 
success.
12to sort out what sort of economic relationship it wishes to have with it. The current 
phase of integration  in  removing  the economic  barriers to permit  access and 
strengthening the regional ability to withstand shocks are of benefit to all whatever 
the particular political arrangements. Monetary union is more fundamental. Among 
larger countries it is a very deliberate decision about political interdependence. For 
smaller countries it is usually an admission of existing economic linkage and the 
benefits of a firm anchor that removes the risk premium.
It is possible, however, simply to assess the state of de facto integration, for 
example by comparing the region to the standards set for monetary integration in the 
EU under the Maastricht Treaty. Cowen et al. (2006) calculate Maastricht style 
criteria for 14 countries in Asia-Pacific (shown in Table 2).
16 On these criteria China, 
Hong Kong and Singapore qualify on all counts and South Korea is within 0.1 of a 
percentage point of qualifying on inflation
17 but all other countries fail on at least 2 of 
the 4 criteria (inflation, interest rates, fiscal deficit, debt ratio). Of these Japan is 
clearly a special case. It has had no trouble avoiding inflation over the last 15 years 
and indeed has been fighting the threat deflation. Its very high debt and deficit ratios 
have been deliberate policies to combat its enduring crisis. Markets do not view these 
policies as unsustainable and the high savings rates are likely to mean that it will be 
straightforward to wind down the excesses, although this will take decades. On 
European experience of the ability to qualify, Malaysia and probably Thailand would 
be able to meet the criteria shortly if they wished but the position for the Philippines 
and particularly Indonesia looks much more difficult. Cambodia, Vietnam and the 
other ASEAN countries not included in the Table are a step back in the process of 
development. Taiwan, of course, which is also not included, would not have much of 
an economic problem in converging, the political problem is something else.
16 They omit the exchange rate criterion, but since most of the countries are managing their exchange 
rates is difficult to know quite how this criterion might be applied.
17 I have followed the euro area’s practice of excluding deflating countries, in this case, Japan, from the 
calculation of the average for the 3 countries with the lowest inflation rates. If it were not included, the 
qualifying standard would be 1.9% inflation or less, which would not alter Table 2 but would make 
South Korea somewhat further off qualification in that period.
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Membership of Organisations Related to Financial Integration in Asia
Country ASEAN
Association 
of South 
East Asia 
Nations
ASEAN 
+ 3
EMEAP
Executives 
Meeting of 
East Asia 
Pacific 
Central 
Banks
APEC
Asia Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation
SEACEN
South East 
Asian 
Central 
Banks*
SEANZA
South East 
Asia, New 
Zealand, 
Australia†
Australia ✔ ✔ ✔
Brunei ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Cambodia ✔ ✔
China ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Hong Kong ✔ ✔ ✔
Indonesia ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Japan ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Laos ✔ ✔
Malaysia ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Myanmar ✔ ✔ ✔
New 
Zealand
✔ ✔ ✔
Papua New 
Guinea
✔ ✔
Philippines ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Russia ✔
Singapore ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
South 
Korea
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Taiwan ✔ ✔
Thailand ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Vietnam ✔ ✔
*Also Fiji, Mongolia, Nepal and Sri Lanka
†Also Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
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Revised Chiang Mai Agreement Swap Arrangements (US$bn)
Borrower
Lender China Indon-
esia
Japan Malay-
sia
Philip-
pines
Singa-
pore
S 
Korea
Thailand Total
China 2 3 1.5 1 4 2 13.5
Indonesia 1 1
Japan 3 6 3.5 3 3 13 3 34.5
Malaysia 1.5 1.5
Philippines 1.5 1.5
Singapore 1 1
S Korea 4 1 8 1.5 1.5 1 17
Thailand 3 1 4
Total 7 9 15 6.5 5.5 3 22 6 74
Source: Sa and Guérin (2004)
Table 1
Basic statistics
Population GDP GDP/head - PPP
Hong Kong 7 190 41,614
Singapore  4 132 36,289
Japan 128 4,366 34,024
Taiwan 23 365 32,490
Brunei  0.4 12 26,411
South Korea 48 888 25,840
Malaysia 28 148 12,754
Thailand 63 206 9,714
China 1,323 2,645 8,788
Philippines 89 118 5,738
Indonesia 232 364 4,684
Cambodia 14 7 3,743
Vietnam 87 61 3,716
Laos 6 3 2,518
Myanmar 49 13 2,432
15Table 2
Convergence of Asian Countries According to the Maastricht Criteria
Inflation rate Interest rate Deficit ratio Debt ratio
Cambodia 5.8 na -3.1 41.4
China 1.8 2.8 -1.3 19.3
Hong Kong 1.1 3.6 0.3 1.9
Indonesia 10.5 13.0 0.4 47.7
Japan -0.3 1.4 -5.8 175.5
Malaysia 3.0 3.6 -3.6 45.4
Philippines 7.6 10.9 -1.9 66.9
Singapore 0.5 3.4 6.0 na
South Korea 2.7 3.5 -0.8 32.0
Thailand 4.5 5.0 0.1 47.4
Vietnam 8.7 8.0 -6.4 43.7
Source: Cowen et al. (2006)
Notes: inflation criterion: average of lowest 3 + 1.5%; interest rate criterion: + 2% on 
the average rate for the lowest 3 inflation countries; deficit criterion: not below -3% of 
GDP; debt criterion: not to exceed 60%. 
Australia, India and New Zealand are in the Cowen et al. calculations but since none 
of these one of the lowest 3 inflation countries they are simply omitted.
Exchange rate criterion not computed in original.
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